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The utility of content-relativism 
Paula SWEENEY† 
 
Abstract. Content-relativism is a semantic theory that states that the content of an 
uttered sentence can vary according to some feature of an assessment context. This 
paper has two objectives. The first is to determine which features a motivational case 
for content-relativism would display—what would a good case for content-relativism 
look like? The second is to consider cases which appear to have the required features 
and evaluate their prospects as motivational cases. I identify two varieties of 
motivational case for content-relativism: content interpretation and content 
enhancement. I conclude that only content enhancement cases are likely to motivate 
content-relativism. 
 
1  Introduction 
 
In ‘Demonstratives’, 1989, Kaplan gave truth-conditional semantics to accommodate 
the fact that our language contains sentences that vary in truth-value according to 
features of the context in which they are uttered. Kaplan highlighted two ways in 
which the truth-value taken by a sentence can vary. First, a sentence may contain an 
indexical, a term which refers to different things in different situations—for example, 
‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘it’—such that what is expressed by a sentence containing 
such a term can vary. For example, the sentence, S, ‘I am wearing red shoes today’ 
will say something about Caitlin at the time when she says it and the same sentence 
will say something about Jodie at the time when she says it. As the truth conditions of 	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S must allow for such differences in truth-conditional content so our semantics reflect 
the fact that propositional content depends on the semantic values of the agent and 
time parameter of the context of utterance and, taking other indexicals into account, 
also on the location, world, and, a little controversially, speakers’ intentions. 
Sentence-truth requires propositional content which is, we assume for the time being, 
determined by utterance context.  
 On the Kaplanian model there is a further way in which the truth-value of a 
sentence depends on context. Assuming S is uttered at w0, the proposition produced 
by the utterance is to be evaluated with regard to w0—it is to be evaluated at the 
circumstance of evaluation determined by the utterance context. For example, if 
Caitlin utters S in w0 then the proposition expressed is to be evaluated for truth at w0. 
But if S contains an operator such as the sentence ‘I might have been wearing my red 
shoes today’, the operator ‘might’ determines that the (nonmodal) proposition, Caitlin 
is wearing red shoes on 1st January, is to be evaluated at some world other than w0. In 
summary, on Kaplan’s theory, sentence truth is doubly relative: to a context 
(supplying a proposition) and to a shiftable circumstance of evaluation (supplying a 
truth-value). 
There are familiar challenges to Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth.1 
Contextualism with regard to less obviously context-sensitive terms such as ‘knows’ 
and epistemic ‘might’ has it that the scope of Kaplan’s theory of indexicals is too 
restrictive—that these other terms also vary in content across different utterance 
contexts. To elucidate with an example, according to contextualism regarding 
epistemic might, an utterance by Joshua of the sentence ‘Sancho might be in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  will	  not	  motivate	  the	  positions	  here.	  For	  more	  details	  of	  and	  motivation	  for	  contextualism	  see	  Lewis	  1996,	  Cohen	  1986,	  DeRose	  1991,	  1992.	  For	  more	  details	  of	  and	  motivation	  for	  nonindexical	  contextualism	  see	  MacFarlane	  2007,	  Recanati	  2007,	  Kolbel	  2002.	  For	  more	  details	  of	  and	  motivation	  for	  truth	  relativism	  see	  MacFarlane 2003, 2005, 2008, Richard, 2008, and 
Laserson, 2005.	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kitchen’ generates the proposition According to Joshua’s current body of information, 
Sancho might be in the kitchen.  
Nonindexical contextualism denies that sentences such as ‘Sancho might be in 
the kitchen’ are propositionally incomplete and, in contrast with contextualism, states 
that the scope of Kaplan’s theory is too restrictive when it comes to taking into 
account ways in which a complete proposition can be true relative to some feature of 
the circumstance of evaluation.  To give an example, according to nonindexical 
contextualism regarding epistemic might, an utterance by Joshua of the sentence 
‘Sancho might be in the kitchen’ generates the proposition Sancho might be in the 
kitchen and the truth of this proposition will vary according to the body of 
information that Joshua has when he utters the sentence.   
Truth-relativists deny that the relevant features for truth evaluation must be 
those of the context of utterance. According to truth-relativists, propositional truth can 
be relative to the context of an assessor. To give an example, according to truth 
relativism regarding epistemic might, an utterance by Joshua of the sentence ‘Sancho 
might be in the kitchen’ generates the proposition Sancho might be in the kitchen and 
the truth-value of this proposition will vary with the body of information that an 
assessor has when he or she assesses Josh’s utterance for truth. 
In summary, there are two ways in which a sentence can vary in truth-value 
across context. First, the truth-value of a sentence may shift in virtue of a variation in 
the content of the proposition produced by the sentence. Second, the truth-value of a 
sentence can vary in virtue of a shift of some feature of the world at which the 
propositional content is to be evaluated. And there are two varieties of context that 
each variation can be relative to—those determined by the context of utterance and 
those determined by a context of assessment. Contextualism, nonindexical 
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contextualism and truth-relativism mark out three of the four possible variants that 
can be located within these two bilateral distinctions. The remaining position—
content-relativism—is to be our focus2 
 
A word regarding my methodology: I will assume that utility is a legitimate 
measure of a theory of context sensitivity. When considering terms with shifty content 
we need to be able to account, not just for semantic content but also for 
communicative utility. Against this criteria it is no coincidence that content-relativism 
has seldom been considered as a serious alternative in the literature for, as an account 
of context sensitivity, it is hardly intuitively useful. In fact, it would not be far off the 
mark to say that content-relativism was initially raised as a possibility simply because 
it was the remaining position in this four-way division of semantic space. 3 To 
appreciate how unorthodox the theory is, we can consider content-relativism as 
applied to a sentence containing a standard indexical. Consider again S. Content-
relativism with regard to S has it that a proposition, P, produced by Caitlin’s utterance 
of S is determined by an assessment context. Any assessment context. So, in addition 
to producing a proposition about Caitlin at the time of utterance, Caitlin’s utterance of 
S in 2012 can also produce the proposition John is wearing red shoes on 1st January 
2030. Content-relativism is clearly a very bad theory for determining standard 
indexical content.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  will	  not	  consider	  theories	  of	  weak	  content-­‐relativism	  such	  as	  those	  proposed	  by	  Cappelen	  in	  ‘Content	  Relativism’	  in	  Kolbel	  and	  Garcia-­‐Carpintero	  (eds.),	  2008	  Relative	  Truth	  in	  which	  the	  character	  of	  a	  term	  or	  sentence	  supplies	  a	  broad	  meaning	  which	  assessors	  can	  then	  sharpen	  within	  their	  respective	  contexts.	  	  3	  Although,	  see	  Egan,	  Hawthorne	  and	  Weatherson,	  2005,	  in	  which	  content-­‐relativism	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  contender	  and	  Weatherson,	  2009,	  in	  which	  content-­‐relativism	  is	  applied	  to	  subjective	  conditionals.	  Andy	  Egan’s,	  2009	  defense	  of	  content-­‐relativism	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  section	  2.	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What possible use could we have for terms, the content of which is left wide 
open for reinterpretation? We like to have control over the things we say partly 
because one is liable for the propositions that one produces and held responsible for 
the non-linguistic knock-on effects. If there are terms in natural language which bring 
about variation in sentence truth across situations we would expect there to be a norm 
securing control over the content that the utterances of such sentences produce. In 
cases where the norm seems unhelpfully restrictive we must point to something 
peculiar in the area of discourse in question to motivate a departure. 
Furthermore, if content-relativism is to be plausible at all, it had better be the 
case that the content of such terms being fixed by someone other than the speaker is 
no bar to successful communication. Consider standard indexicals. Shifting the 
relevant feature of context that fixes the content of a standard indexical term shifts the 
meaning. Consider S again: 
 S: I am wearing red shoes today.  
Shift the value of a content-fixing parameter and the meaning expressed by the 
sentence will be entirely different. The usefulness of content-shifting terms like ‘I’ 
and ‘today’ is partially dependent on this content-shifting feature. But it is also 
partially dependent on the fact that the value of the content determining features of 
context are generally transparent, not only to the speaker but also to interlocutors. In 
situations where these features are not transparent competence dictates that one 
should avoid using an indexical and use an invariant term instead. To exemplify, 
when one says ‘Hello’ on the telephone and the interlocutor replies with “Who is 
that?” it is unhelpful to reply with ‘It is me!’ Likewise when lost in the woods one 
should not text one’s rescuers with ‘I am here!’. Note that the inappropriateness of 
these responses can not stem from ‘It is me’ and ‘I am here’ expressing semantically 
	   6	  
incomplete propositions, for complete propositions are produced, the problem is that 
the content could not be grasped by an interlocutor because the relevant features of 
the context of utterance are likely to be opaque to her.4  
So, the utility of indexicals is a combination of semantic and pragmatic 
features. Indexicals work by picking up on features of context but this semantic fact is 
not in itself sufficient to explain their usefulness in natural language—we must add 
the fact that such features of context are generally transparent. The pragmatic feature 
is relevant to the semantic account. Kaplan’s semantic theory is persuasive because it 
dovetails with an implicit pragmatic theory, supplied above, to account for the 
usefulness of indexicals. Without the supplementary fact that features of context are 
generally transparent, Kaplan’s theory would in no way explain the role of indexicals 
in natural language.  
Applying the same criteria to content-relativism we require the account to be 
one that may be pertinent to successful communication. But in what area(s) of 
discourse would content-relativism be useful? 
Given the attributes of content-relativism, an area of discourse which would 
provide motivation would be one with the following features. First, the truth-value of 
sentences in this discourse would intuitively vary across contexts.  (But this is not a 
sufficient feature as each of our four theories accommodates this.) Second, the 
variation of truth-value of the sentence uttered is a result, not simply of variability in 
certain features of the world at which the proposition is to be assessed for truth 
(nonindexical contextualism and relativism accommodate this), but of some term or 
terms in the sentence being, in some aspect, incomplete and requiring the value of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  is	  not	  to	  foreclose	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  might	  be	  widespread	  ‘semantic	  blindness’.	  Contextualist	  solutions	  to	  puzzles	  and	  paradoxes	  generally	  proceed	  precisely	  through	  positing	  unnoticed	  context-­‐shifting.	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  that,	  in	  those	  cases,	  the	  context	  sensitivity	  is	  only	  motivated	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  provide	  a	  reasonable	  response	  to	  the	  paradox	  in	  question.	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parameter of context to fix the content of the proposition expressed (contextualism 
gives us this.) Finally, the discourse in question must be one in which it would be at 
least useful, if not necessary, for the propositional content of a sentence to be fixed, 
not by the context in which it was uttered but by some alternative context(s) all 
together.5  
It may seem very unlikely that such a discourse would have evolved—that we 
would be involved in a linguistic practice in which we are responsible (in the sense 
that one is responsible for the things one says) for contents that are entirely out with 
our control. However, I identify two distinct categories of motivational case for 
content-relativism. The first kind of case is one in which it would not be a mark 
against the utility of a term were its content not settled once and for all by utterance 
context but left for interpretation by different agent, because the context of another 
agent is equally well suited as the speaker’s context to settle content. I will call such 
motivational cases for content-relativism Content Interpretation. Under this banner I 
consider but ultimately reject recent motivational proposals put forward by Egan, 
2009.  
The second kind of motivational case I consider is one in which a speaker 
makes an assertion in full knowledge of the fact that her utterance context is in some 
sense deficient and that there is another—to her, practically inaccessible—context 
which would be preferable in determining the content of the proposition she 
expresses.  I will call these variants of motivational cases for content-relativism 
Content Enhancement.  
 
2  Content Interpretation: ‘You’ need not be so sensitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Of course, it could be that the assessment context and the utterance context coincide but the 
distinctive features of content-relativism are shown only when they come apart.  
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Egan, 2009, presents us with a series of cases in favour of content-relativism for some 
standard indexicals.6 In Billboard Horton produces a billboard on which is written the 
sentence, ‘Jesus loves you’. Frank and Daniel each drive past the billboard and read it. 
We are to have the intuition that the propositions expressed are the singular 
propositions, Jesus loves Frank and Jesus loves Daniel. However, according to Egan, 
the standard Kaplanian model, in limiting us to content determining features of the 
context of utterance, restricts us to a group proposition of the form Jesus loves G, 
where G is the group that Horton has in mind in the context of producing the 
billboard.7 
Billboard is a complicated case. It involves multiple ‘non-standard’ features of 
communication—for example, (i) the utterance preparation context is distinct from 
the utterance context (ii) the utterances are deferred (taking place at some later stage 
from the communicative intention) and (iii) the referent of ‘you‘ is to vary across 
many different situations. Although features (i) and (ii) of Billboard are semantically 
irrelevant they are potentially confusing. It will prove fruitful to focus first on another 
case given by Egan, Sermon, which highlights feature (iii), before returning to 
Billboards. In Sermon, Horton calls out ‘Jesus loves you’ to an audience including 
Frank and Daniel. Again we are to have the intuition that Horton has expressed 
singular propositions to each member of the audience. And, again, according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I do not consider all of Egan’s cases here but consider what I take to be the most prominent cases. 
The ‘billboard’ cases are a variation of what are known as ‘answering machine cases’. For an in-depth 
discussion of answering machine cases, including a discussion of how they differ from these ‘billboard 
cases’, a survey of the various responses in recent literature, and a statement of my own response to 
answering machine cases, see Sweeney, forthcoming. 7	  Contrary	  to	  Egan’s	  claim	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  what	  is	  expressed	  (nor	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  expressed)	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  a	  singular	  proposition.	  However,	  I	  grant	  Egan	  this	  assumption	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument.	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Egan’s interpretations of the Kaplanian model, Horton can only have expressed a 
general proposition.  
As I pointed out in Dodd and Sweeney, 2010, (i) is unproblematic. There are 
many nonstandard forms of communication, where ‘standard communication’ is 
talking face-to-face with one’s interlocutor, which involve an initial stage of 
preparation of a communicative tool—a recorded message or a sign—and where the 
intentions of the manufacturer of the tool are semantically irrelevant. Where we 
require an agent to supply intentions for some indexical the relevant individual is one 
with the communicative intention (i.e. the individual who wanted to communicate 
something via the billboard) and that need not be the individual who paints the 
billboard. (ii) is also unproblematic for Kaplanian semantics, as demonstrated in Dodd 
and Sweeney, 2010, and Sidelle, 1991, and as Egan, 2009: 256-9, explicitly accepts. 
The tricky feature of Billboards is (iii). It is (iii) that provokes any content-relative 
intuitions we may have. The difficulty in (iii) lies in two components. First, the 
sentence in Billboard contains an indexical term that requires speaker’s intentions to 
fix reference and, second, we require multiple singular propositions.   
 Egan’s challenge to the Kaplanian model is that it cannot give us the multiple 
singular propositions that we need. But Egan reaches this conclusion by running two 
apparent restrictions or limitations together. The first is that the Kaplanian model 
restricts us to one utterance per context. The second is that we cannot get the 
intuitively right content(s) from the agent’s context.  
First, how does the Kaplanian model restrict us to one proposition per context? 
It cannot be that Egan takes the Kaplanian model to restrict us in the following way: 
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ONE SENTENCE/ONE CONTENT: The Kaplanian model prohibits a single sentence from 
expressing different contents to different individuals. So the sentence ‘Jesus loves 
you’, cannot be used to express the propositions Jesus loves Frank and Jesus loves 
Daniel. 
 
Clearly ONE SENTENCE/ONE CONTENT is false. The role of the theory of indexicals 
given by Kaplan is precisely to explain how a single sentence can express different 
contents. Perhaps we are restricted by the following principle: 
 
ONE SENTENCE-IN-A-CONTEXT/ONE PROPOSITION: Kaplanian semantics demands a one-
to-one correspondence between a sentence-in-a-context and a proposition. 
 
If this is correct and we are faced with cases in which intuitions demand that the 
sentence express many different propositions relative to a given context of utterance, 
it might be thought that the Kaplanian model is too restrictive. However, we can grant 
ONE SENTENCE-IN-A-CONTEXT/ONE PROPOSITION without concluding that the 
Kaplanian model is too restrictive. 
Our temptation to take ONE SENTENCE-IN-A-CONTEXT/ONE PROPOSITION to be 
overly restrictive is due to our having confused it with the following (false) nearby 
principle: 
 
ONE SENTENCE-IN-A-CONTEXT-OF-UTTERANCE/ONE PROPOSITION: The Kaplanian 
model demands a one-to-one correspondence between a sentence-in-a-context-of-
utterance and a proposition.  
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This principle says that, for each act of utterance there will be one concrete utterance 
situation and therefore, one proposition expressed. But Kaplan distinguishes contexts-
of-utterance—concrete situations in which utterances can occur—from contexts—a 
formal sequence of parameters (Kaplan, 1989b: 591). And there is nothing in 
Kaplan’s theory to stop there being more contexts (in his technical sense) and hence 
more sentences-in-contexts, than there are utterances. In fact, Kaplan explicitly claims 
that his theory allows for just that;  
 
I have sometimes said that the content of a sentence in a context is, roughly, 
the proposition the sentence would express if uttered in that context. This 
description is not quite accurate on two counts. First, it is important to 
distinguish an utterance from a sentence-in-a-context. The former notion is 
from the theory of speech acts, the latter from semantics. Utterances take time, 
and utterances of distinct sentences cannot be simultaneous (i.e., in the same 
context). (1989a: 546) 
 
The point is that the practical limitations of making an utterance need not place limits 
on the semantic notion of a sentence-in-a-context. One cannot actually utter both ‘I 
am hungry now’ and ‘I am tired now’ at the same time. But all that follows from this 
is the fact that the propositions generated by each sentence where the context is held 
fixed, will never actually be produced by one’s utterances. Bill could certainly hold 
up two written signs simultaneously, one declaring ‘I am tired now’ and the other 
declaring ‘I am hungry now’ and thereby produce the propositions Bill is hungry at t 
and Bill is tired at t.  
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Perhaps, then, the concern that motivates Egan is that we cannot get the 
intuitively right content(s) from the agent’s context. The fact that Egan employs 
interpreters’ contexts to fix the value of ‘you’ (to themselves) indicates that he 
believes, maybe because the propositions expressed include members of the audience, 
that we need interpretation sensitivity to fix content. If this is Egan’s assumption, it is 
based on a misunderstanding. 
The directing intentions of the speaker fix the value of ‘you’. Certainly, in a 
standard case, it would be very odd to think that it is the job of the person who may be 
the intended referent to fix the reference of a given use of ‘you’. If each person who 
heard one uttering a sentence containing ‘you’ could reasonably interpret it to be 
about them we would be responsible for saying all sort of false and potentially 
awkward things.8 It is very counterintuitive to think that the referent of ‘you’ in a 
standard case is fixed in this way. 
Generating multiple propositions from a sentence containing ‘you’ requires 
multiple directing intentions. So the final hurdle for the Kaplanian theory regards 
whether or not it dictates that directing intentions are to be restricted to the singular. If 
directing intentions are not restricted to the singular then Egan’s cases offer no 
motivation for content-relativism. 
In ‘Afterthoughts’ Kaplan considers this very question; 
 
The same demonstrative can be repeated, with a distinct directing intention for 
each repetition of the demonstrative. This can occur in a single sentence, 
‘You, you, you and you can leave, but you stay’ or in a single discourse, ‘You 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Just think of the trouble you could get into by saying ‘I love you‘ to your partner in a crowded room. 
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can leave. You must stay.’ Such cases seem to me to involve an exotic kind of 
ambiguity, perhaps unique to demonstratives.  
He continues,  
The meaning of a demonstrative requires that each syntactic occurrence be 
associated with a directing intention, several of which may be simultaneous. 
And if it happened to be true that we never held more than one such intention 
simultaneously, that would be the mere technicality. In fact, it is not true. In 
the aforementioned cases (‘You, you, you, and you…’), in which there is 
simultaneous perception of all addresses, I think it correct to say that [there] 
are several distinct, simultaneous, directing intentions, indexed to distinct 
intended utterances of the demonstrative ‘you’ (which are then voiced one at a 
time). The basic fact here is that although we must face life one day at a time, 
we are not condemned to perceive or direct our attention to one object at a 
time. (1989b: 587) 
 
Neither a context of use (situation) nor a context (in the technical sense) is limited to a 
single directing intention. Granted, Kaplan’s example is not entirely analogous with 
Sermon. In Kaplan’s example the sentence contains many occurrences of ‘you’. In 
Sermon the sentence contains just one occurrence of ‘you’. Nevertheless, what 
Kaplan’s example does demonstrate is that there is no barrier to an agent holding 
many directing intentions simultaneously.  
There are, at least, two options available to the Kaplanian. First, the sentence 
‘Jesus loves you’, combined with the one context of many directing intentions, 
generates a very long proposition of the form, Jesus loves Frank, Bill, John, Tom 
…etc. The speaker intends to refer to each member of he audience individually but 
	   14	  
the ‘you, you, you, you….‘ are simply too numerous to mention. Still the directing 
intentions are there! So when ‘you‘ is uttered it is directed to each of the intended 
addressees, generating the very long proposition.  
Second, given that Kaplan’s theory allows an agent to have multiple 
simultaneous directing intentions, and given the agent’s intention to communicate a 
singular proposition to each member of the audience, we say that, although there is 
only one context of utterance (context in the situation sense) there are many contexts 
(in the formal sense). That is, Horton’s intention to communicate many singular 
propositions plus his many directing intentions supplies the following contexts: 
 
<Horton, t1, l1, directing intention: John> 
<Horton, t1, l1, directing intention: Frank> 
<Horton, t1, l1, directing intention: Bill> 
<Horton, t1, l1, directing intention: Tom> 
<Horton, t1, l1, directing intention: …> 
 
generating the following context/sentence pairs: 
 
Jesus loves John 
Jesus loves Frank 
Jesus loves Bill 
Jesus loves Tom 
Jesus loves …  
 
Either way, it is clear that Sermon provides no motivation for content-relativism.  
	   15	  
Now that we are clearer on the possibility of multiple directing intentions, we 
are better equipped to return to Billboard. Imagine that Horton lives in a small town 
where the inhabitants stick to a very precise routine. Every day only John, Bill, Frank 
and Tom drive past the billboard in the order that their names are listed above. 
Horton, who wants to tell each individual who reads the billboard that Jesus loves 
them, makes a fancy electronic billboard that ‘says’ Jesus loves John when John 
drives past, Jesus loves Bill when Bill drives past, and so forth. No need for audience 
sensitivity here. But as there are no indexicals involved there is no need for any 
theory of context-sensitivity. 
Now consider a slight variation. We are in the same town. Horton forms the 
same intentions to communicate with John, Bill, Frank and Tom. But he does not 
have the funds for the fancy sign, so he makes a ‘Jesus loves you’ sign with the firm 
intention of communicating to each of John, Bill, Frank and Tom, that Jesus loves 
them. Horton formed the intention to express a bunch of singular propositions. If we 
allow Horton to use the token ‘Jesus loves you’ to express the singular proposition 
just to John, surely he can re-use the same sign to express singular propositions to 
each of the others.  
Consider this final variation. Horton lives in a much bigger town. He does not 
know each of the inhabitants, but he knows that, for each individual living in the 
town, Jesus loves that individual. And Horton wants to communicate this to each 
individual. But he has no money whatsoever. Not even enough to make a ‘Jesus loves 
you‘ sign. So Horton stands at the side of the road and, to every person who passes by 
Horton shouts ‘Jesus loves you!’. Once again, there is no need for audience 
sensitivity. 
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What makes this last case so different from Billboard?9 Given the distinctions 
I have made and the fact that the mechanisms of utterance production are semantically 
irrelevant, there is no semantic difference between the situation where Horton shouts 
to each individual and the situation where, via Horton’s preparation and intention, the 
billboard ‘tells’ each individual that drives past that Jesus loves them. So why would 
we need content-relativism in one case but not in the other? We do not.  
In summary, neither Billboard nor Sermon provides motivation for content-
relativism.  In section 3 and 4 I turn to content enhancement cases. 
 
3 Content Enhancement I: epistemic modals 
 
There is a use of ‘might’ which seems to convey something like ‘given information 
base I, P is possible’. For example, when asked where Fred is, Ginger replies, 
 
 M Fred might be practicing his Rumba. 
 
What Fred is actually doing is irrelevant to the truth-value taken by an utterance of M. 
That it, the fact that Fred is practicing his Tango does not make Ginger’s assertion 
false. What is relevant to the truth-value of M is whether Fred practicing his Rumba is 
compatible with some body of information. At first glance it seems as if Ginger’s 
claim is true if it is compatible with her own body of information, motivating either 
contextualism or nonindexical contextualism. But truth-relativists have pointed to the 
following form of retraction to motivate the view that epistemic modals are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Note	  that	  Horton	  need	  not	  have	  de	  re	  thoughts	  about	  his	  intended	  referent:	  it	  is	  enough	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  whoever	  it	  is	  that	  drives	  past	  him/reads	  the	  sign.	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assessment sensitive (see MacFarlane, 2006, and Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson, 
2005): 
 
Ginger  Fred might be practicing his Rumba. 
Bing  No, I just saw him having his lunch. 
Ginger  Oh, I guess I was wrong. 
 
According to the truth-relativist the fact that Ginger can truly make the modal 
assertion and then truly claim that this assertion was false is evidence in favour of 
truth-relativism. 
Let’s step back and ask, what is the purpose of asserting an epistemic modal 
claim? Not always, but typically, these assertions take place in a context where the 
purpose is to reach a non-modal fact, in this case regarding Fred’s current activities. 
Call such a proposition P. Intuitively, competent assertion of the modal claim requires 
that you neither know P to be true nor know P to be false. But you do know that there 
is an information state that would settle the matter once and for all—namely the 
information state which contains either P or not-P. Reaching that information state is 
often the ultimate aim of the modal assertion.  
It is true that this aim is not explicitly expressed. Explicitly the modal 
assertion simply supplies information regarding what is compatible with (at least) the 
speaker’s body of information. But, given the aim of a modal assertion, it seems 
plausible that, in addition to modal assertions giving information about the speaker’s 
information state, they also request information of others. Loosely stated, it would not 
be far of the mark to interpret the pragmatic effect of a modal assertion as being Here 
	   18	  
is my information state—what is yours?10 And, somewhat peculiarly, the best 
information state in terms of reaching the aim will be one that contradicts the 
speaker’s, because only that state will narrow the information base and get you closer 
to your aim: discovering whether or not P. Think of it this way: if all of your 
interlocutors agree with your modal claim you may be no closer to knowing whether 
or not P; all you would know is that P is compatible with all of their information 
states. On the other hand if someone disagrees with you then the worlds in which Fred 
is practicing his Rumba are no longer possibilities and progress is made. 
If epistemic modal claims are content-relative an assertion of M by Ginger 
would produce the following propositions: 
 
 (Compatible with Ginger’s information state) Fred is practicing his Rumba 
 (Compatible with  information state X) Fred is practicing his Rumba 
 where X is an assessor of Ginger’s assertion. 
 
Suppose that Bing overhears Ginger’s assertion—an assertion which he interprets as 
(Compatible with Bing’s information state) Fred is practicing his Rumba—and Bing 
happens to know that Fred is having lunch right now. Bing will assess this proposition 
as false. Ginger’s utterance has produced a false proposition. (It also produced the 
true proposition corresponding to her own information state.) Bing is likely to respond 
to Ginger’s assertion with the pronouncement that it is false and that, in fact, Fred is 
having lunch. And the ultimate aim of the discourse, to reach the truth of the non-
modal claim, is achieved.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  One	  might	  think	  that,	  given	  the	  aim	  of	  assertion	  of	  a	  modal	  it	  is	  mysterious	  that	  one	  does	  not	  simply	  ask	  ‘Where	  is	  Fred?’.	  But	  notice	  that	  on	  the	  model	  described	  here	  the	  modal	  claim	  has	  more	  utility	  than	  the	  question	  as	  it	  gets	  across	  two	  pieces	  of	  information,	  (i)	  the	  speaker	  does	  not	  know	  where	  Fred	  is	  and,	  (ii)	  the	  speaker’s	  information	  state	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  Fred	  practicing	  his	  rumba.	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The standard contextualist cannot achieve this result because, according to the 
standard contextualist, Ginger’s assertion only produced the proposition (Compatible 
with Ginger’s information state) Fred is practicing his Rumba, and that proposition 
will be true at all contexts. The nonindexical contextualist cannot achieve this result 
because the truth of the invariant proposition is fixed by her utterance context so, 
again, the proposition Fred is practicing his Rumba, as asserted by Ginger, is true at 
the fixed evaluation context.  
The truth-relativist can accommodate the data. According to the truth-
relativist, Ginger’s assertion of the invariant proposition is true relative to the 
information state of an assessor. So, it will be true as assessed by Ginger and false as 
assessed by Bing. On hearing Ginger’s utterance of the invariant Fred might be 
practicing his Rumba, Bing will assess it is false, will pronounce it so and, again, the 
ultimate aim of the discourse is achieved.  
However, what is peculiar on the relativist picture is that, from the later 
perspective of t’, Ginger cannot assess her earlier utterance as having been true. That 
is, according to the truth-relativist semantics, from the later perspective, retraction is 
the only appropriate response. It is far from obvious that this should be the case. To 
motivate the intuition that Ginger need not retract consider a situation in which 
Ginger is challenged for making her modal claim. 
 
 Ginger: Fred might be practicing his Rumba. 
 Bing:  No, I just saw him having his lunch. So, why did you say that?! 
Ginger: Because it was true! For all I knew then he might have been 
practicing his Rumba.  
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That is, either (although perhaps not both) of the responses below seem appropriate 
from Ginger’s updated context of assessment: 
 
Ginger-1 Oh, I guess I was wrong. 
Ginger-2          Well, it was still true that he might have been practicing his 
Rumba. 
 
The truth-relativist is correct to point out that retraction is an appropriate response but 
it would also be appropriate for Ginger to respond by saying that what she said earlier 
was true given what she knew then. While the truth-relativist can agree that, from the 
later perspective, Ginger’s earlier assertion was appropriately made, she cannot 
account for the fact that it was appropriate made because it was true. To clarify, the 
truth-relativist assumes that we only stand by utterances that we assess as being true. 
The earlier utterance is false as assessed from the later context. Note that it is not 
simply that it would have been false if asserted now, but that, as assessed now, it was 
false as asserted back then.  As such the truth-relativist is committed to retraction. 
However, from the same assumption that we only stand by utterances that we take to 
be true, content-relativism can accommodate both retraction and non-retraction as, 
according to content-relativism, Ginger’s utterance produced the following 
propositions: 
 
(1) (Compatible with Ginger (t) information state) Fred is practicing his Rumba. 
(2) (Compatible with Ginger (t’) information state) Fred is practicing his Rumba. 
 
(1) is (eternally) true and (2) is (eternally) false. 
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In summary, it is claimed that epistemic modals display the following 
features: (i) speakers are aware that a context other than the utterance context is 
superior in terms of reaching their aim, (ii) retraction of claims from an improved 
information state is appropriate and (iii) pointing out, even from the improved 
information state, that the proposition produced was—not just excusable—but 
excusable because true relative to the impoverished information state, is appropriate. 
(i) offers pragmatic support for content-relativism for modal claims: it makes 
sense for us to be willing to let go of the content of our assertions in this discourse. 
Our practice of retraction, (ii), indicates that the content of our earlier utterances 
varies with our assessment context, while (iii) shows that the content asserted relative 
to our utterance context is still available from a later assessment context that we 
occupy.  
In as much as accommodating (i), (ii) and (iii) is desirable, then epistemic 
modals offer a motivational case for content-relativism. 
 
4 Content Enhancement II: future-contingents 
MacFarlane, 2003, used a puzzle concerning future-contingents to motivate truth- 
relativism. The puzzle was one of apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the 
truth-value of an assertion about some future event. Consider an assertion of the 
sentence ‘There will be a heat-wave this summer’. Call this sentence FC. It seems that 
an assertion of FC is truth evaluable. Certainly at the end of the cold, wet summer one 
will be prone to admitting that one’s early assertion was false. At the same time it 
seems intuitively appealing to think that the future is not presently settled—that it is 
not currently settled that there will be a heat-wave this summer: that the matter is as 
yet undetermined. In order to accommodate this indeterminacy as more than just an 
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epistemic indeterminacy resulting from our lack of omniscience regarding future 
events, we will follow MacFarlane (and others—see Belnap et al 2001) and think of 
each possible way that the future could be as an equally real ‘world’, overlapping at 
the moment of utterance. That is, in order to accommodate strong, objective 
indeterminacy we will introduce a metaphysical framework on which there are at least 
two equally real possible futures overlapping at the moment of utterance—one on 
which there is a heat-wave this summer and another on which there is not. 11 Due to 
this unsettledness we have the intuition that my heat-wave assertion is indeterminate 
in truth-value at the time of utterance—it is neither true nor false: this is the 
indeterminacy intuition. However, according to MacFarlane, we also have the 
intuition that the very same utterance has a determinate truth-value— it is either true 
or false—from some later perspective after the event has or has not taken place: this is 
the determinacy intuition. 
MacFarlane claims that any solution to the problem of future contingents must respect 
both the determinacy intuition and the indeterminacy intuition. However, to respect 
both of these intuitions is to say that the truth of the sentence uttered is relative to the 
context in which the utterance is being assessed. Adapting Belnap’s double time 
reference semantics MacFarlane claims that his theory supplies the truth-values 
required to match our conflicting intuitions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The puzzles of future contingents that I am concerned with here rest on an unusual metaphysical 
framework—a branching world model combined with a b-theoretic model of time. There are 
independent motivations for such a framework, outlined in detail in Sweeney, forthcoming. For the 
purpose of this paper we will simply take the framework as an assumption—one that is required to get 
MacFarlane and Belnap’s puzzles off the ground.  
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Double time reference semantics (Belnap, 2001b: 1-22): S is true [false] at a 
context of utterance u and context of assessment a iff S is true [false] at every 
point m/h such that  
 m = the moment of u 
h passes through m and (if the moment of a>m) through the moment of 
a as well.  
 
We evaluate S with respect to the moment of initialisation (i.e. utterance) and all of 
the histories passing through both that moment and the moment of assessment. 
Idealising contexts u and a as moments we get the following results. 
 
(i) At u = m0 and a = m0, S is neither true nor false. This is because we must look at 
both histories, h1 and h2, as both histories pass through the context of assessment. 
 
Truth-relativism may be adequate in accommodating our conflicting intuitions 
regarding the truth-value of the utterance in question. However, it leaves unaddressed 
a further problem of future-contingents—that of explaining why such sentences are 
assertable in the first place, given that they are indeterminate, not only in truth-value 
but also in content. This is the primary problem that Belnap et al are concerned with 
in Facing the Future, 2001.  
Future-contingents appear to be assertable yet, as the context of utterance holds more 
than one possible future the propositions expressed by future-contingents cannot take 
a truth-value at all—not even a ‘third’ truth-value such as indeterminate. They are 
open-sentences. And, as Belnap points out, open-sentences such as ‘It is pink’, uttered 
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in a context where there is no object to be supplied for the variable, are unassertable.  
Notice that both Belnap et al and MacFarlane assume that the propositional content of 
the asserted sentence Lightening will strike the clock tower tomorrow will remain the 
same regardless of whether we occupy a b-branching world or not. And they assume 
that the standard Kaplanian semantics will have no problem delivering such a content. 
This assumption is up for challenge. 
 
‘Tomorrow’ is a directly referential term. The Kaplanian linguistic rule for 
determining the content of an utterance of ‘tomorrow’ is (something like) the 
calendar day after the day of the assertion. But, given the branching framework, this 
linguistic rule does not fully determine a referent for each context. If we occupy a 
branching world and we do not take history to be relevant to the content of 
‘tomorrow’ there can be no unique content to a given use—no unique event that a 
given occurrence of ‘tomorrow’ refers to.  
 
The problem is that ‘tomorrow’, ‘in two weeks’, ‘next year’ and so on are pure 
indexicals—when such terms appear in a sentence they must refer to a unique event in 
order for the sentence to become fully propositional. (This is not the case with the 
other target terms of MacFarlane’s assessment sensitivity such as ‘tasty’, ‘knows’ and 
‘might’. These terms refer to properties—tastiness, knowing, epistemic might—and 
properties which are arguably instantiated relative to a taster, knower or epistemic 
agent.) Yet, in order for an utterance of a sentence containing an indexical such as 
‘tomorrow’ to refer to a unique event, in order for such an utterance to generate a 
unique propositional content, something must be said about the content fixing 
significance of the history of utterance. As ‘tomorrow’ is an indexical—a term for 
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which truth-variation is a result of content-variation—we cannot simply assume, as 
MacFarlane does, that variation in the history of context is not relevant to the content 
of a given occurrence of the indexical. MacFarlane is right that we have the 
indeterminacy intuition and the determinacy intuition. But they are intuitions of 
variable content, first and foremost. 
 
As emphasised above, there is, in Kaplan’s semantics, no bar to having partially 
overlapping formal contexts: we can accept that there are (at least) two overlapping 
formal contexts in play: one for each admissible history. 
 
If this is correct then Belnap was mistaken in thinking that, according to Kaplan’s 
semantics, there can be no unique history of the context. In our world as described, 
there is no unique history of the context of utterance, but this is of no relevance to our 
formal semantics and is compatible with there being multiple content-fixing contexts 
of assessment.  
 
If branching time is actual then the character of a future looking term such as ‘will’ 
should reflect the branching framework in the following way: the utterance of the 
future contingent generates, not an open sentence or indeterminate proposition, but 
two, closed, determinate propositions, each necessarily true or false relative to all 
histories of evaluation. 
 
 Situation m0:  ‘Lightning will strike the church spire tomorrow.’ 
  
Formal contexts:  <location0, world0, time0, history1> 
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    <location0, world0, time0, history2> 
 
 Propositions:   Lightning will strike the church spire at t+ 1 day/h1. 
    Lightning will strike the church spire at t+ 1 day/h2. 
 
As the semantics predicted, the referent of ‘the proposition produced by the utterance’ 
is indeterminate, leaving utterance-truth indeterminate. But sentence-truth is, contrary 
to Belnap and MacFarlane, entirely determinate.  
 
In we adapt the character of forward looking indexicals to reflect the branching nature 
of the future then an adequate semantic theory for accommodating future contingents 
falls out of Kaplan’s semantics. If we occupy a branching world our utterances of 
future contingents sentences generate countless propositions. In such cases we are 
likely to be confused regarding the content of our utterances. But, although this is an 
unwelcome consequence, it is only to be expected in a world as radically 
indeterminate as the one described. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we identified two forms of putative motivational case for content-
relativism: content interpretation cases and content enhancement cases. We 
considered a content interpretation case from recent literature and concluded that it 
did not provide motivation for content-relativism. It may be that some other as yet 
unconsidered area of discourse does provide content interpretational motivation for 
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content-relativism. However I think it is more likely that, given the stipulated nature 
of the content interpretational cases—that another context will be just as suitable as 
the speaker’s context—a move away from the ‘just as suitable’ speaker’s context will 
be difficult to motivate. I then considered two different content enhancement cases—
cases for which the speaker’s context is in some way impoverished and an alternative 
context is better equipped to provide content. I concluded that in cases where such 
conditions are met—and there may be more cases than the two I have considered 
here—there are reasons to prefer content-relativism over other models of context 
sensitivity. *  
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